The Chicago School has produced many significant contributions to the antitrust literature of the last half century. Thanks in part to Chicago School efforts today we have an antitrust policy that is more rigorously economic, less concerned with protecting noneconomic values that are impossible to identify and weigh, and more confident that markets will correct themselves without government intervention. This Chicago School revolution came at the expense of the Harvard "structural" school, which flourished from the 1930s through the 1950s. That school rested on a fairly rigid theory of Cournot oligopoly, exaggerated notions about barriers and impediments to entry, and a belief that certain types of anticompetitive conduct were more-or-less inevitable given a particular market structure. However, the chastised Harvard School that emerged in the late 1970s in the writings of Phillip E. Areeda and a converted Donald F. Turner were much less ambitious about the goals of antitrust, more concerned with conduct as such, and significantly more skeptical about the benefits of aggressive judicial intervention.
reiterated these requirements.
11
Perhaps a lingering difference between the Chicago and Harvard approaches to predatory pricing lies in the Chicago preference to consider "recoupment" first and the Harvard preference to look at price-cost relationships. But the fact is that under the Harvard approach both are essential to a predatory pricing claim. Further, which one is more "fundamental," or best examined first, is heavily driven by facts. In cases of easy entry or numerous rivals who can expand output lack of recoupment is easy to measure and should lead to a quick dismissal.
12 But other cases, including Brooke Group itself, require fairly strong assumptions about oligopoly behavior in order to assess the likelihood of recoupment. That case refused to condemn prices significantly below cost in a market (cigarettes) with no recent entry and a long history of lockstep oligopoly pricing, after observing that even a relatively well disciplined oligopoly has occasional relapses.
The same thing is true about price-cost relations. In some cases measuring them is extraordinarily difficult, particularly if the defendant produces multiple products with common costs. In other cases measurement is easy, as when prices are clearly above any measure of cost, or when they are below even the direct cost of inputs. In sum, whether recoupment or price-cost relationships is the "bedrock" doctrine in a predatory pricing case depends entirely on the circumstances.
The same thing has largely been true in unilateral refusal to deal cases, where the Chicago School generally argued for per se legality and the Harvard School took a more nuanced approach looking at the nature of the facility or input for which dealing is claimed and the impact of the refusal on competition. In its Aspen decision the Supreme Court adopted a standard for unilateral refusals to deal that was more hostile than either the Chicago or Harvard Schools advocated.
13
In Trinko, however, the Supreme Court completely ignored the Chicago School literature but relied numerous times on Harvard School literature in placing stringent limitations on refusal to deal doctrine.
14
In antitrust policy toward vertical restraints, the strong Chicago position was that they should be lawful per se. 15 Today it seems fairly clear that these stronger views jumped too quickly from the Chicago theory that free riding was an important explanation for vertical restraints 16 to the conclusion that it was virtually the only explanation. The Harvard position has been more nuanced, finding sustantial risk that powerful dealers could use RPM to create a price umbrella for themselves. 17 In 1997 in State Oil the Supreme Court adopted the rule of reason rather than per se legality for maximum RPM, and in Leegin Creative Products in 2007 a divided Supreme Court overruled the nearly century old Dr. Miles decision and did the same thing for minimum RPM. 18 No one advocated the Chicago School "per se legal" position. Justice Kennedy, speaking for the majority, applied a rule of reason but recognized that RPM could impose competitive harm. Justice Breyer, speaking for four dissenters believed it was too late in the day to abandon the per se rule.
In tying and exclusive dealing law the scope of liability has narrowed considerably over the last twenty years. The Chicago School became famous for its critique of tying law exploding the "leverage" theory and finding little basis for condemning either tying or exclusive dealing. 19 The Harvard School has been more reserved, seeing potential for harm if the market structure is monopolistic or conducive to monopoly.
20
One completely justified development, driven entirely by Harvard School ideology, is the increased use of '2 of the Sherman Act for exclusionary contracting, sanctioned in both Microsoft and Dentsply.
21
Antitcompetitive tying and exclusive dealing are always best analyzed as "unilateral" practices, because the downstream party is either unwilling or else is agreeing to exclusivity only in exchange for something else.
22 Further, the market share requirements for anticompetitive exclusive dealing or tying are generally significant and make the practices more suitable for evaluation under '2. Recent case law in tying and exclusive dealing has been driven mainly by Harvard approaches. In sum, notwithstanding Chicago School efforts to write "foreclosure" out of the list of worthwhile antitrust concerns, the case law continues to recognize a concept of market foreclosure that has been a mainstay of Harvard School antitrust policy since Joe Bain's writings on entry barriers in the 1950s, although it has been considerably disciplined in subsequent years.
On remedies, at least some members of the Chicago School have advocated severe limitations on antitrust enforcement, including the virtual elimination of competitor suits, 24 and significant changes in the way that antitrust measures damages, including measuring of damages in accordance with optimal deterrence rather than plaintiffs' losses, and the at least selective abolition of treble damages.
25 By contrast, the Harvard position has tried to develop a more coherent and economically defensible model for private remedies that preserves more of the traditional doctrine and is more faithful to the statutory language. Thus the Harvard School developed the concept of "antitrust injury" to ensure that the rationale for private remedies corresponds with the rationale for applying the antitrust laws in the first place.
26 Along with this it developed much more severe rules for plaintiff standing. By and large the courts have followed the Harvard School approach, refusing to abolish competitor lawsuits but placing more stringent limitations on them.
One significant place where the Supreme Court has adopted Chicago rather than Harvard reasoning is the indirect purchaser rule, which awards the full trebled overcharge to direct purchasers and no damages at all to indirect purchasers. The Supreme Court's opinion in Illinois Brick largely under '2 but remanding '1 tying claim). followed the Landes-Posner approach. 27 The Harvard approach, which is more consistent with both standard rules of damages measurement and the language of '4 of the Clayton Act, is that direct purchasing intermediaries should recover lost profits, while end users should recover the overcharge.
24

28
For direct purchasing intermediaries who pass the monopolized product on down the distribution chain the overcharge is not even a rough approximation of the injury they sustain.
29
Rather, their injury comes mainly from lost volume. Indeed, the indirect purchaser rule often assigns the full damage action to actors who are not injured by the monopoly price at all, or who would simply be unable to prove any injury if relegated to traditional principles of damages measurement.
In sum, antitrust law as produced by the courts today comes much closer to representing the ideas of a somewhat chastised Harvard School than of any traditional version of the Chicago School. Of course, at least some members of the Chicago School have moved to the left just as Harvard has moved to the right.
30
But the question for today is whether the law making of '2 has moved far enough. Perhaps this Harvard School influence is nothing more than a stop along the way to a much more hard core set of Chicago positions in which the courts conclude that practices such as predatory pricing, unilateral refusals-to-deal, or vertical restraints are simply not worth the expense of litigating them and should be dismissed summarily. If that is the case, then it could be said that '2 law continues to produce too many false positives and needs even further discipline from its high point in the 1940s and 1950s, when the courts condemned such things as the construction of bigger plants 31 or a lessor's price discrimination 32 as monopolistic.
I believe the Supreme Court and the circuit courts are generally about where they should be in defining '2 standards. This statement needs to be qualified in two ways. First, there are a few areas, elaborated below, where the decisions seem to be systematically overdeterrent or underdeterrent.
Secondly, courts continue to make errors, and they always will. But an error is not necessarily a sign of something fundamentally wrong with antitrust doctrine. For example, the Ninth Circuit's test in the Kodak v. Image Tech. case for unilateral refusals to deal, including refusal to license patents and copyrights, is almost certainly wrong, largely because the court either misread or ignored existing law. damages study that should never have seen the light of day.
34 And the Third Circuit LePage's decision condemned package discounts on a woefully inadequate analysis of cost-price relationships or power to exclude an equally efficient rival.
35
But none of these decisions tells us very much about the state of '2 law. The Federal Circuit promptly took issue with the Ninth Circuit's Kodak decision and the great weight of scholarly authority rests with the Federal Circuit.
36 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's 1997 Kodak decision is about the only victory that plaintiffs can claim in the wake of the Supreme Courts 1992 decision denying summary judgment in the same case.
37
Conwood is probably best described as a case where the court was overwhelmed with the record of tortious conduct, so much that they neglected to require proof that the conduct made any kind of contribution at all to monopoly power and failed to follow Daubert standards for expert testimony with sufficient rigor. LePage's almost certainly overreached with respect to a practice (package discounts) that was poorly understood and for which more rigorous tests were inadequately developed. negatives also relates to improperly identified monopoly power.
Here the bleakest spot in the Rehnquist Court is undoubtedly its 1992 Kodak decision, which permitted courts to define product markets narrowly for buyers who were "locked in" to aftermarket purchases by virtue of their previous purchase of some piece of complex durable equipment.
39 But as noted above, Kodak has acquired very little traction in the lower courts.
On the other side, the so-called "Cellophane Fallacy" is still with us, and continues to produce false negatives in analysis of single-firm market power.
40 Briefly, assessing single-firm power by observing cross-elasticity of demand at current market prices overlooks the fact that the firm may already be charging monopoly prices. This means that conventional market delineation techniques may systematically understate the market power of dominant firms. 
40.
For some fairly pessimistic conclusions by a prominent economist temporarily employed by the Antitrust Division, see Dennis W. Carlton, Market Definition: Use and Abuse, ___ Competition Policy Int'l. (2007) (forthcoming).
41.
A recent possible example is HDC Medical, Inc. v. Minntech Corp., 474 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2007) (single-use and multiple-use dialyzers, which cost more, were in same relevant market because they performed the same function, at least where the plaintiff offered no evidence other than the price difference itself for placing them in separate markets; case can be read narrowly for proposition that plaintiff simply did not carry its burden of showing that the degree of substitutability was insufficient to hold the alleged monopolist's product to cost). See also 
Exclusionary Conduct: the Problematic Quest for a Single Test
The recent literature on '2 has been preoccupied to the point of obsession with the formulation of a single test for exclusionary conduct. Some have advocated a "sacrifice" test --namely, that anticompetitive exclusion consists in a willingness to sacrifice short run revenues for the future benefits of high prices in a market from which rivals have been excluded. Others have advocated a "no economic sense" test that condemns conduct under '2 only if the conduct makes no economic sense unless it is understood as a mechanism for excluding rivals in order to earn monopoly profits down the road. Still others believe conduct should be condemned under '2 only if it is capable of excluding an equally efficient rival. Yet others would condemn conduct that unreasonably raises rivals' costs. Finally, some believe that no single test captures the entire range of practices that we might wish to condemn as unlawfully exclusionary.
"Sacrifice" and "No economic sense." Together, the "sacrifice" and "no economic sense" tests for unlawful exclusionary behavior offer the narrowest grounds for condemning conduct as monopolistic. Taken literally, they avoid balancing because any reasonable prospect of net gain to the monopolist that does not come from injury to competition exonerates the defendant. Thus these tests avoid the definitional and measurement complexities that can serve to make tests based on net welfare unworkable, at least in close cases.
The Aspen decision condemned conduct when the defendant "was not motivated by efficiency concerns and ... was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival."
42 So-called "sacrifice" tests for exclusionary conduct look at the defendant's willingness to sacrifice short-term revenues or profits in exchange for larger revenues anticipated to materialize later when a monopoly has been created or the dominant firm's position strengthened. The rationale of the sacrifice test is that conduct that seems rational (profit maximizing or loss minimizing) without regard to the creation or preservation of monopoly have a fully legitimate explanation. Since no firm should be regarded as a trustee for either its rivals' or consumers' welfare, such conduct cannot be condemned without running a severe risk of chilling competitive behavior.
The best example of such a test in the case law is the recoupment test for predatory pricing given in the Brooke Group case, although it appeared in lower court opinions and the academic literature much earlier. 43 The sacrifice test is also useful in unilateral refusal to deal cases to the extent that, if we are to have law condemning refusals to deal at all, we must have a mechanism for identifying the very small subset of refusals that should be condemned. In Trinko the government relied on a sacrifice theory in arguing that the alleged refusal to deal did not satisfy any Sherman Act standard of illegality.
44
One particular problem with sacrifice tests is that most substantial investments involve a short term "sacrifice" of dollars in anticipation of increased revenue at some future point. The automobile manufacturer who constructs a new plant is certainly in such a position. It spends money on the plant during a lengthy period of planning and construction, hoping to realize ("conduct is exclusionary where it involves a sacrifice of short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense only insofar as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly power"); and id. at *19-20 ("If such a refusal involves a sacrifice of profits or business advantage that makes economic sense only because it eliminates or lessens competition, it is exclusionary and potentially unlawful.").
higher profits several years down the road after the plant goes into production. To be sure, the profitability of the new plant need not "depend on" harmful effects on a rival, but in a concentrated market it is certainly likely to have such effects. Further, the new plant might not succeed unless rivals are forced to reduce their own output. Nevertheless, building a new plant under such circumstances is almost always procompetitive.
Likewise, product innovations are always costly to the defendant, and their success may very well depend on their ability to exclude rivals from the market, but neither of these factors is or should be decisive in subsequent antitrust litigation. All innovation is costly, and many successful innovations succeed only because consumers substitute away from rivals' older versions and toward the innovator's version. In sum, the sacrifice test does not adequately distinguish anticompetitive "sacrifice" from procompetitive "investment."
The sacrifice test seems to work poorly in areas of '2 law unrelated to predatory pricing or refusal to deal. Some exclusionary practices, such as exclusive dealing or tying, exclude immediately and are likely to be profitable to the dominant firm from the onset of the practice, so neither short term sacrifice nor subsequent recoupment is necessary to make the practice profitable. Other practices, such as improper infringement suits, are often costly to the defendant in the short-run whether or not they are anticompetitive. Indeed, the improper patent infringement suit is likely to be most costly to the dominant firm when the infringement defendant has the resources to defend it; and may not be particularly costly when the infringement defendants are nascent firms who are easily excluded from the market.
The "no economic sense" test, which is similar to the sacrifice test in some respects, would refuse to condemn exclusionary single firm conduct "unless it would make no economic sense for the defendant but for its tendency to eliminate or lessen competition."
45 The "no economic sense" test offers a good deal of insight into the question of when aggressive actions by a single firm go too far, but it can lead to erroneous results unless complicating qualifications are added. Not all monopolizing conduct that we might wish to condemn is "irrational" in the sense that the only explanation that makes it seem profitable is destruction or discipline of rivals. Indeed, monopolizing conduct is not necessarily extremely costly to the defendant. For example, supplying false information or failing to disclose important information to a government official or standard setting organization need not cost any more than supplying truthful information, but can create monopoly under appropriate circumstances.
46
Indeed, the provision of false information may be less costly than provision of truthful information, for false information is easier and cheaper to manufacture. Further, the provision of such information to a government official might be profitable (i.e., "make sense") whether it destroys a rival or merely if it results in increased output to the defendant. For example, the firm that acquires a patent by making false statements to the patent examiner and then brings infringement actions against rivals might be dominant and bent on protecting that position.
47 But it might also be one of many firms in a product differentiated market, seeking to do no more than protect its sales from a close substitute.
Conduct capable of excluding equally efficient rival. Judge Posner's proposed definition of exclusionary conduct would require the plaintiff to show:
that the defendant has monopoly power and ... that the challenged practice is likely in the circumstances to exclude from the defendant's market an equally or more efficient competitor. The defendant can rebut by proving that although it is a monopolist and the challenged practice exclusionary, the practice is, on balance, efficient. This definition has enjoyed some recognition in the case law. For example, in condemning the targeted package discounts at issue in LePage's, the Third Circuit observed that "even an equally efficient rival may find it impossible to compensate for lost discounts on products that it does not produce."
49 The "equally efficient rival" test has also found acceptance in predatory pricing cases, particularly in discussions of how to identify a price as predatory. The reasoning is that a firm should not be penalized for having lower costs than its rivals and pricing accordingly. As a result, a price is predatory only if it is reasonably calculated to exclude a rival who is at least as efficient as the defendant.
50 Judge Posner's own examples in defense of his definition of exclusionary conduct pertain to pricing. He writes that it:
would be absurd to require the firm to hold a price umbrella over less efficient entrants.... [P]ractices that will exclude only less efficient firms, such as the monopolist's dropping his price nearer to (but now below) his cost, are not actionable, because we want to encourage efficiency.
51
Clearly we do not want low cost firms to hold their prices above their costs merely to suffer a rival to become established in the market.
The equally efficient rival definition of exclusionary conduct can be underdeterrent in situations where the rival that is most likely to emerge is less efficient than the dominant firm. Consider the filing of fraudulent or 49. LePage 
52
The value of infringement actions as entry deterrence devices is greatest when the parties have an unequal ability to bear litigation costs. This will typically be before or soon after the new entrant has begun production. The filing of a fraudulent patent infringement suit, unlike setting one's price at or a little above marginal cost, is a socially useless practice. But the strategy might very well not be effective against an equally efficient rival, who could presumably defend and win the infringement claim. In this case Judge Posner's definition of exclusionary conduct seems unreasonably lenient and even perverse. It exonerates the defendant in precisely those circumstances when the conduct is most likely to be unreasonably exclusionary.
Raising Rivals' Costs (RRC).
Several anticompetitive actions by dominant firms are best explained as efforts to deny rivals market access by increasing their costs. Such strategies may succeed in situations where more aggressive ones involving the complete destruction of rivals might not. Once rivals' costs have been increased the dominant firm can raise its own price or increase its market share at their expense. 2003), which queries "whether the alleged exclusionary conduct succeeds in furthering monopoly power (1) only if the monopolist has improved its own efficiency or (2) by impairing rival efficiency whether or not it enhances monopolist efficiency." The second part of this test would condemn a firm for using practices that lowered its own costs if, in the process, they denied scale economies to a rival. See, e.g., Elhauge, id. 324 (arguing that even if economies of scale are very substantial, above a 50% market share, the firm cannot use exclusive contracts to increase its output into a lower cost range but must simply set its price). The Elhauge test would also condemn a firm who used a practice that increased its sales beyond the point that its scale economies topped out, if in so doing it denied scale economies to a rival. See id. at 324 (illustration of firm whose tie, exclusive deal, or other agreement requires customers to purchase 70% of the market from it, even though its economies of scale top out at 40%). Even assuming such tests were desirable, they seem to make unrealistic demands on tribunals to measure relevant scale economies. See 2B Antitrust Law &408 (3d ed. 2007).
The real value of RRC theories is not to create a new set of unlawful exclusionary practices, but rather to show that certain practices that have traditionally been subjected to antitrust scrutiny can be anticompetitive even though they do not literally involve the destruction of rivals. Situations in which rivals stay in the market but their costs increase may be more likely to occur and exist in a wider variety than those in which rivals are destroyed. Further, cost raising strategies might be less detectable and less likely to invite prosecution. Indeed, a strategy of raising rivals' costs need not injure a rival severely at all if the dominant firm increases its own prices to permit smaller firms a price hike that compensates them for their cost increase. As a result, RRC operates as a kind of substitute for the older antitrust theories of anticompetitive exclusion that required the complete foreclosure or destruction of rivals, and accordingly provoked competitive responses. Many cases brought under both ''1 and 2 of the Sherman Act have acknowledged the theory.
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Of course, the law has never required complete market exclusion as a Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th 1987) (alleged agreement between union and contractors' association under which union would obtain fee from all employers without whom it had collective bargaining agreements, whether or not they were association members, to be paid to the association, probably intended to raise the costs of non-member contractors). Cf. Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1340 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting RRC claim that Blue Cross forced hospitals to submit lower bids for taking care of BC patients, with result that it had to impose higher charges on non-BC patients).
prerequisite to suit. Indeed, some successful '2 plaintiffs have both grown their market shares and earned high profits even through the period that the exclusionary practices were occurring.
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In sum, RRC is a useful but also incomplete definition of exclusionary practices. Further, many practices that raise rivals' cost, such as innovation that either deprives rivals or revenue or forces them to innovate in return, are also welfare enhancing. As a result, "raising rivals' costs" can never operate as a complete test for exclusionary conduct.
56 One must always add an adverb such as "unreasonably," but that invariably requires some kind of balancing or trade off.
No Single Test. Each of the previously discussed tests is useful for assessing some types of exclusionary conduct but much less so for others. Given the current state of the law my own preference is the "test" proposed in the Antitrust Law Treatise that monopolistic conduct consists of acts that:
(1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals; and (2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits that the acts produce, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to the resulting benefits.
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To this should be added that the practice must be reasonably susceptible to judicial control, which means that the court must be able to identify the conduct as anticompetitive and either fashion a penalty producing the correct amount of deterrence or an equitable remedy likely to improve competition. This concern is driven by a proposition that is central to both the Chicago and Harvard positions: administrability is key. More complex rules 56. This is apparently the source of Judge Posner's objection. See Posner, Antitrust Law note __ at 196, referring to RRC as "not a happy formula" because one way of raising rivals; costs is to be more efficient than the rival, thus denying it scale economies. are not helpful if they cannot be effectively applied. This formulation given above is not so much a test as a series of premises. Clause (1) of the test ensures that the conduct is both exclusionary and "substantial," in the sense that it is reasonably capable of creating or prolonging monopoly. Clause (2a) deals with the easiest case for identifying anticompetitive exclusion; namely where no consumer benefit whatsoever can be shown. Clause (2b) deals with situations where a less restrictive alternative might produce equivalent benefits, and (2c) deals with the small number of situations thought to require some kind of balancing of harms and gains. Beyond this formulation, courts must still develop specific tests for specific types of conduct, such as the recoupment/price-cost test for predatory pricing, or the "no economic sense" test for unilateral refusals to deal.
Problem Areas
Monopolization law's conceptual and administrative problems will probably never be solved, given the open-ended nature of '2's "monopolizing" language. A few problem areas seem worth noting.
One area of widespread agreement is that misuse of government process can create monopolies. Patent and other IP exclusions have been particularly problematic and arguably have produced a fair amount of underdeterrence. For example, ever since the Supreme Court's Walker Process decision in 1965 the use of improper or overly broad patent claims to maintain or create monopoly has been a significant source of antitrust litigation.
58
Walker Process itself spoke very generally of infringement actions based on patents that were obtained by "fraud." Today the law has become much more technical and stylized. Many claims continue to involve enforcement actions based on patents that were acquired by inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Not every instance of inequitable conduct renders a patent unenforceable. Federal Circuit law on the question considers enforceability by addressing two issues. One is the nature of the misconduct and the intent behind it; the other is "materiality," or the likelihood that the patent examiner would have disapproved the patent (or a patent claim) had the misconduct not occurred. In general, the more aggressive the misconduct the smaller the showing of materiality need be to make a patent unenforceable, and vice versa. However, the court also held that the degree of inequitable conduct necessary to invalidate the patent was not as great as the degree needed to support an antitrust claim. In this case the only evidence of the patentee's anticompetitive intent was the fact that it had made the 800 sales over a one week period and then later swore to the PTO that the sales had not occurred. Of course, it subsequently also filed a patent infringement suit against those offending one or more of the claims made in the patent. The Federal Circuit held that while this omission clearly qualified as inequitable conduct, it fell short of fraud in the Walker Process sense, which requires a stronger showing of both intent and materiality.
63
In order to support a Walker Process antitrust case "there must be evidence of intent separable from the simple fact of the omission."
64 The court observed:
It might be argued that because the omitted reference was so important to patentability, DDI [the patentee] must have known of its importance and must have made a conscious decision not to disclose it. That argument has some force, but to take it too far would be to allow the high materiality of the omission to be balanced against a lesser showing of deceptive intent by the patentee. Weighing intent and materiality together is appropriate when assessing whether the patentee's prosecution conduct was inequitable. However, when Walker Process claimants wield that conduct as a "sword" to obtain antitrust damages rather than as a mere "shield" against enforcement of the patent, they must prove deceptive intent independently. 
64.
Id. at __ ("The difference in breadth between inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud admits the possibility of a close case whose facts reach the level of inequitable conduct, but not of fraud before the PTO. This is such a case."). This approach re-creates some of the same horrors of pre-Matsushita antitrust litigation under standards reluctant to grant summary judgment, except in reverse. It requires a discovery trip through the patentee's documents for evidence of anticompetitive "intent" other than that manifested in the patent application itself. Further, it makes the infringement defendant's antitrust counterclaim dependent on the vagaries of the patentee's document retention policy or other efforts to suppress incriminating information, often attending pre-application activities that occurred many years prior to the litigation. For example, in Dippin Dots the sales found to invalidate the patent occurred in 1987. The subsequent patent infringement suit was filed in April of 2000, some thirteen years later.
Id. at ___ (internal citations omitted
66
Another problem area is the law of strategic pricing, including various sorts of discounting policies. Both the "recoupment" test and the AVC test for predatory pricing are imperfect and underdeterrent. The "recoupment" test as developed in Brooke Group denigrated the value of disciplinary actions within oligopoly. The degree of competitiveness in concentrated industries varies widely and in some the value of disciplinary pricing can be quite high to market leaders and harmful to consumers. Cigarettes, with a long history of lock-step pricing, is very likely such an industry.
The AVC test basically identifies short-run marginal cost as the proper baseline for measuring predation, and the Areeda-Turner variation recognizes prices above average variable cost as a virtual safe harbor for predation claims. It is generally acknowledged that the AVC test can be underdeterrent, particularly in circumstances where fixed costs are high, which is most often the case in markets that are structurally susceptible to monopolization.
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Discounting practices have been particularly problematic in recent years. The law seems to be in roughly the same position that the law of predatory pricing was in the seventies and eighties. The early formulations focused heavily on intent, and cost tests played a secondary role, to the point that some decisions were willing to condemn predation on prices above any measure of cost.
Single-product and "aggregated" multi-product discounts can pose 
different issues.
68 Some single-product discount challenges have been to socalled "market share" discounts, which reward purchasers for purchasing a specified percentage of their needs from the defendant. These discounts differ from and are less harmful to competition than exclusive dealing in several respects. First, because the specified percentage is less than 100%, they foreclose less than exclusive dealing imposed by a seller with the same market share. Second, and most significantly, the penalty for falling below the minimum percentage is loss of the discount, which means that the buyer can evade the contract at any time simply by paying the seller the higher price. Third, and most significantly, an equally efficient firm can match a fully discounted price that is above the defendant's costs.
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The most common argument for condemning above cost market share discounts is that they may serve to raise rivals' costs by depriving them of sufficient sales to attain economies of scale equivalent to those enjoyed by the defendant. Here, the same set of considerations would appear to apply as the courts have applied in predatory pricing cases such as Brooke Group. First, one might be able to envision circumstances in which above cost single-product discounts can be used to reduce rivals' scale economies, and welfare might be reduced in the process. But second, one doubts that the courts can administer '2 claims under such a theory without creating an intolerable risk of chilling procompetitive behavior, a result that could be far more socially costly.
70 Manifestly, the law of predatory pricing does not rest 68. This discussion largely ignores defenses, which are significant and almost certainly explain the great majority of situations in which discounting occurs. See 11 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &&1810-1814 (2d ed. 2005).
69.
See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 979 (2000) (refusing to condemn above cost market share discounts by dominant firm because equally efficient rival could steal the sales at any time).
70.
See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223:
As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting.... "To hold that the antitrust laws protect competitors from the loss of profits due to such price competition would, in effect, render illegal any decision by a firm to cut prices in order to increase market share. The antitrust laws require no such perverse result."
on the premise that anticompetitive, above cost pricing strategies are implausible. In fact, such theories are quite numerous and varied. 71 Rather, the law rests on the observation that Article III courts and, in particular, juries are not able to distinguish such strategies with sufficient clarity to avoid condemning procompetitive behavior.
The situation of aggregated multi-product discounts is even more complex because an equally efficient firm making only one product or a subset of products in a bundle may not be able to match an aggregated discount. Assume that the defendant is the only firm in the market making products A and B. Rivals make one but not the other. If the defendant ties a discount to combined purchases of A and B an equally efficient rival making only B might be able to match the discounted B price, but not the foregone discount on A that results from the buyers' failure to take the requisite amount of both A and B.
Whether such discounting practices should be condemned at above cost prices and, if so, when raises a number of interesting questions that have been explored quite thoroughly in the literature although less so in the case law. First, if at least one significant rival also makes both A and B then the strategy should not be condemned simply because the plaintiff, who makes only one of the products, cannot match the discount. Second, the discount will not exclude an equally efficient single product rival unless when the full discount is attributed to the product upon which exclusion is claimed the price of that product falls below cost. Or to state this differently: one needs to ask whether the incremental price of the two products when they are bundled is enough to cover the incremental cost of producing the bundle. Both the Harvard and Chicago School positions currently require a costbased test, which can provide both relative administrative simplicity and avoid the kind of overdeterrence that is certain to result from non-cost-based tests that invariably look at the defendant's intent. As the Ninth Circuit noted in its Cascade Health decision, the attribution test is something of a compromise, requiring less than a showing that the entire package is priced at below cost, but more than impossible-to-administer formulations that avoid costs altogether or require farirly precise measurement of such things as multi-faceted and the defendant has repeatedly been condemned 75 a carefully tailored structural remedy is probably necessary, including but perhaps not limited to forced sharing of IP rights. The time seems ripe to become more aggressive about structural remedies once again, particularly for repeat offenders.
